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ESSAY 
DEAR PRESIDENT BUSH: LEAVING A LEGACY ON THE 
FEDERAL BENCH 
Carl Tobias * 
The appointments of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice 
Samuel Alito were milestones in your stated quest to transform 
the courts. Appreciating that a critical duty assigned to the presi-
dent by the Constitution is nominating and, with Senate advice 
and consent, appointing judges, you vowed to recommend "strict 
constructionists." Selection has enhanced importance, given mod-
ern perceptions that judges are essentially the final arbiters of 
societal disputes, including such questions as terrorism and af-
firmative action. The Hamdan u. Rumsfeld 1 and Grutter u. Bol-
linger2 opinions as well as the public school desegregation 3 and 
Schiauo 4 litigation trenchantly illuminate those notions. 
You can still alter the courts, although only ten months are 
left. Other Justices could resign. You named three hundred appel-
late and district judges in the first seven years and may choose 
another fifty. Realization of your objectives necessitates finesse 
because losing the Senate majority, declining citizen approval, 
and rising politicization will exacerbate confirmation's already in-
* Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to thank Chris-
topher Bryant and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Carolyn Hill and Tammy Long-
est for processing this piece as well as James Rogers and Russell Williams for generous, 
continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
2. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
3. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
4. Schiavo ex rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir.), stay denied, 544 
U.S. 945 (2005); Bush v. Shiavo, 885 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2004), cert denied, 543 U.S. 1121 
(2005). 
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tractable nature. Since 2001, the process has manifested divisive 
charges and recriminations among you, who tendered controver-
sial nominees, the GOP, which supported them, and Democrats, 
who applied filibusters when blocking the candidates, even as 
Republicans pledged to limit this venerable device. If the situa-
tion remains acrimonious, it will compound appointments' griev-
ously deteriorated condition, further undermining respect for the 
Executive, the Senate, and the judiciary-a phenomenon wit-
nessed by the nomination of Harriet Miers. Thus, the nation's 
welfare dictates that you rise above politics and halt those corro-
sive dynamics. 
You must expeditiously adopt bold, creative steps as your ad-
ministration closes and approval ratings plummet, if you are to 
fill the court vacancies and burnish your legacy. Indeed, you may 
name several Justices and half the federal appellate and district 
judges, and they will be resolving cases long after you depart the 
White House. 
I. A SELECTIVE HISTORY OF MODERN FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL SELECTION 
When Jimmy Carter assumed office, few women or persons of 
color were judges. 5 President Carter rectified this dearth by using 
special initiatives to guarantee that female and minority attor-
neys were confirmed. 6 Emblematic was his request that senators 
tender additional women and people of color, as well as imple-
ment district nominating panels to foster their approval. 7 When 
President Carter left office, women constituted twenty percent of 
appointees, and persons of color twenty-one percent. 8 
5. See Robert J. Lipshutz & Douglas Huron, Achieving a More Representative Federal 
Judiciary, 62 JUDICATURE 483, 484 (1979); Elliot E. Slotnick, Lowering the Bench or Rais-
ing It Higher?: Affirmative Action and Judicial Selection During the Carter Administra-
tion, 1 YALE L. & POL 'y REV. 270, 271 (1983). 
6. Lipshutz & Huron, supra note 5, at 484. 
7. See, e.g., ALAN NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING COM· 
MISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES 31 (1981); Federal Judicial Se-
lection: The Problems and the Achievements of Carter's Merit Plan, 62 JUDICATURE 463-
510 (1979). See generally infra note 55. 
8. See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 18-19 (2001). Diverse ap-
proaches yield varying conclusions about the statistics. Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judi-
cial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318, 322 tbl.2 (1989) 
(14.4% women, 13.9% African-American, 6.9% Hispanic, and 5% Asian); see also SHELDON 
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Ronald Reagan asserted that his 1980 election was a mandate 
to place conservatives on the bench. 9 He searched for and ap-
pointed numerous individuals with conservative views but desig-
nated few women and minorities. Not even two percent of jurists 
chosen were African Americans. 10 Once George H.W. Bush tri-
umphed, he essentially honored Reagan's philosophy by seating 
many conservative nominees and tapping few minority lawyers, 
yet Bush recommended a plethora of women. 11 
After his 1992 ascendance, Bill Clinton emphasized competence 
and diversity over ideology, selecting talented jurists who aug-
mented political balance and establishing records for women and 
people of color. 12 However, Republican and Democratic infighting 
left more than eighty judgeships unoccupied at the Clinton Ad-
ministration's culmination. 13 
II. JUDICIAL SELECTION IN YOUR FIRST SEVEN YEARS 
After your extremely narrow first victory, you promised to ap-
point strict constructionists. 14 The limited election mandate re-
GoLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT 
THROUGH REAGAN 236-84 (1997); Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 
BYU L. REV. 1257, 1259-61 (15.5% women and 14.3% African-American). 
9. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS 
OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 137-41 (2005); DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE 60-64 
(1988). 
10. See George, supra note 8, at 19 n.39; Goldman, supra note 8, at 322 tbl.2, 325 & 
tbl.4; see also Tobias, supra note 8, at 1269. See generally GoLDMAN, supra note 8, at 334-
35; O'BRIEN, supra note 9. 
11. See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the Battle for the 
Federal Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871, 877 (2005) [hereinafter Goldman, Wars]; Sheldon 
Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282, 290-91 (1993) 
[hereinafter Goldman, Final Imprint]. 
12. See George, supra note 8, at 10-11, 19 & n.39; Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, 
Clinton's Second Term Judiciary: Picking Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 265, 276, 
282 (1999); Rorie Spill Solberg, Diversity and George W. Bush's Judicial Appointments: 
Serving Two Masters, 88 JUDICATURE 276, 278-79 (2005). See generally Carl Tobias, Fill-
ing the Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309, 324-25 (1996). 
13. Both parties share much blame. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 12, at 283-
84; Carl Tobias, Choosing Judges at the Close of the Clinton Administration, 52 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 827, 846 (2000); see also Lisa Holmes & Elisha Savchak, Judicial Appointment 
Politics in the 107th Congress, 86 JUDICATURE 232, 234-35 (2003). 
14. See, e.g., Going Head to Head, AB.A. J., Oct. 2000, at 42, 42-43; E. J. Dionne, Jr., 
Talking Sense on Court Choices, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2004, at A29. See generally Presi-
dent's Remarks Announcing Nominations for the Federal Judiciary, 37 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. Doc. 724, (May 9, 2001) [hereinafter President's Remarks] (noting that every ap-
pointed judge will interpret the law, not legislate from the bench). 
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quired compromises, as Democrats' assumption of Senate control 
six months after the election changed the political landscape. 15 
Your reduced reliance on longstanding, valuable American Bar 
Association ("ABA") input correspondingly provoked Democratic 
opposition, which stymied appointments. 16 The GO P's mid-term 
recapture of the Senate facilitated confirmation efforts. 17 How-
ever, when you nominated attorneys whom Democrats challenged 
as overly ideological, even resorting to filibusters, 18 appointments 
stalled. 19 The confirmation process, thus, yielded vicious accusa-
tions and retorts, invocation of strategic measures for partisan 
gain, and fractious behavior that devoured enormous resources. 
You chose three hundred judges over your initial seven years in 
office, but fifty positions are now empty, and Democrats recap-
tured the Senate in 2006. 20 
15. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Road to Federal Bench Gets Bumpier in Senate, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 2001, at A16; David Rogers, Sen. Jeffords Defects from GOP, Creating Era 
of'Tripartisanship,' WALL ST. J., May 25, 2001, at A16. See generally Sheldon Goldman et 
al., W. Bush Remaking the Judiciary: Like Father Like Son?, 86 JUDICATURE 282, 293-94 
(2003). 
16. See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to Martha W. Barnett, 
ABA President (Mar. 22, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2001/03/20010322-5.html; see also Laura E. Little, The ABA's Role in Prescreening Federal 
Judicial Candidates: Are We Ready To Give Up on the Lawyers?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 37, 37 (2001). See generally AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY-WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS 1, 1 n.1 (2007); Goldman et al., supra 
note 15, at 290-92. 
17. See Neil A. Lewis, G.O.P. Links Judicial Nominees To Thwart Opponents, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2003, at 21 (explaining the procedure of lumping nominee hearings to-
gether to make opposition more difficult); Richard Simon, Senate OKs Long-Delayed Ap-
peals Court Nomination, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2002, at A22. See generally Michael J. 
Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 667 (2003). 
18. See generally Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the Constitution: When a Ma-
jority Is Denied Its Right To Consent: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 
Civil Rights, and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003); 
Michael Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 445 
(2004); Martin Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option To Change Senate Rules 
and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means To Overcome the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J. L. & PuB. 
POL 'y 205 (2004). 
19. Press Release, President George W. Bush, President Bush Says Senate Filibuster 
Decision a "Disgrace" (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releas-
es/2003/03/20030306.html; see also John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Proc-
ess and the Need for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL 'y 181, 182-83 (2003); 
Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Filibustering Judicial Nominees, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 331 & n.2 (2005). 
20. Robert Carp et al., The Decision-Making Behavior of George W. Bush's Judicial 
Appointees, 88 JUDICATURE 20 (2004); Goldman et al., supra note 15; see also Ruth Mar-
cus, Specter Unbound, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2005, at A21; Jeffrey Toobin, Blowing Up the 
Senate, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 7, 2005, at 42; Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Va-
cancies in the Federal Judiciary-llOth Congress, http://www.uscourts.gov/cfapps/webno 
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III. JUDICIAL SELECTION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 
BALANCE OF YOUR PRESIDENCY 
A. Goals and Reasons for Achieving the Objectives 
1. Merit and Filling the Judicial Vacancies 
1045 
Cementing a legacy necessitates that you articulate clear goals. 
Merit should be your touchstone. Strive to guarantee nominees 
who are exceptionally intelligent, diligent, and independent while 
possessing balanced temperament-attributes John Roberts ex-
hibits. If the courts operate with able jurists and no vacancies, 
they can fairly and promptly treat growing, ever more compli-
cated litigation; reduce a number of districts' civil backlogs; and 
quickly process appeals, which have increased exponentially. 21 
2. Political Ideology 
De-emphasize ideology. You characterized Antonin Scalia and 
Clarence Thomas as your "favorite" Justices and named strict 
constructionists during the past seven years. 22 The electorate 
might have assumed you would select conservative jurists and 
offset Democratic appointees' putative liberalism. 23 For example, 
when then-Judiciary Committee head, Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), re-
fused to question then-Judge Roberts during confirmation about 
reproductive freedom and declared that any nominee who would 
overturn Roe would face a challenge in the Senate, many excori-
vada/CF _FB_301/archived/judgevac04_01_08.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008). 
21. JAMES C. DUFF, 2006 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 13, 15 
(2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/completejudicialbusiness.pdf; JU-
DICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 10--11 
(1995), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/lrp/CVRPGTOC.HTM. See generally Michael 
Gerhardt, Merit v. Ideology, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 353 (2005); Patrick Shin, Judging Merit, 78 
S. CAL. L. REV. 137 (2004). 
22. See Michael Kinsley, Commentary, Fool Me Twice, Shame On Me, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 16, 2005, at M5; Neil A. Lewis, The 2000 Campaign: The Judiciary, Presidential 
Candidates Differ Sharply on Judges They Would Appoint to Top Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
8, 2000, at A28; John Yoo, High Court Peace Offering, WASH. POST, July 21, 2005, at A23. 
23. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) opposed President Clinton's efforts to pack courts 
"with liberal activists." Neil A. Lewis, Utah Senator Scolds Critics of Prosecutor in White-
water, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1996, at Al2; see also Judicial Activism: Assessing the Impact: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights, of the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997); Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in 
the Second Clinton Administration, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 744 (1997). 
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ated him. 24 Nominating conservatives is dogma for the Right, as 
the selection processes for Roberts, Miers, and Alito illustrate. 25 
If you continue to embrace ideology, analyze countervailing fac-
tors. No empirical data actually show that President Clinton rec-
ommended "activist,'' liberal jurists whom you must balance. Even 
were activism more felicitously defined, Clinton appointees and 
liberal judges are not its only practitioners, as the Supreme Court 
members you revere have demonstrated. 26 President Clinton 
tapped few activist or liberal jurists, downplayed ideology, 
stressed competence and gender and racial balance, and proposed 
numerous federal district and state judges. 27 He actually es-
chewed ideology and liberals' remonstrations to choose jurists 
who would offset GOP appointees. 28 If you explicitly focus on ide-
ology, nonetheless, Democrats will level the same criticisms they 
did at prior Republican administrations. Too much emphasis will 
spark vociferous opposition and be counterproductive, worsening 
dysfunctional selection. Allegations and counter-charges will 
mount as the process spirals downward. Those activities will un-
dercut regard for you, the chamber, and judges. 
24. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senator Will Not Ask Roberts To Take a Stand on Abortion, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, § 1; see Maura Reynolds, Specter Won't Limit Roberts Queries, 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at A14; Jill Zuck.man, Arlen Specter, "The Smartest Lawyer in 
the Senate," CHI. TRIB., July 25, 2005, at 1; Toobin, supra note 20, at 2. 
25. "No more Souters" is their rallying cry. See Lewis, supra note 22; No More Souters, 
WALL ST. J., July 19, 2005, at Al4; David G. Savage, Judge Battle Transcends Numbers, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005, at Al (discussing the nominees' party labels and their effect on 
national policies). 
26. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 
144-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also SCOTI' DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE THOMAS 4 (1999) (noting that Justice Thomas has helped 
rethink public law issues such as affirmative action, religious liberty, and federalism); 
DAVID ANDREW SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF 
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 82 (1996) (discussing how Justice Scalia has actively protected 
government institutions in his judicial decisions and opinions); KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, 
THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 2-4 (2006); Paul Gewirtz & Chad Golder, So Who Are the 
Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at A19; Schiavo ex rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 
1270, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (Birch, J., concurring). See generally Jess Bravin & Jeanne 
Cummings, Roberts Shows Some Openness, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2005, at A4; Jess A. Ve-
lona, Partisan Imbalance on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 89 JUDICATURE 25 (2005). 
27. See Theresa M. Beiner, How the Contentious Nature of Federal Judicial Appoint· 
ments Affects "Diversity" on the Bench, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 849, 854 (2005); Goldman & 
Slotnick, supra note 12, at 267, 273-82. 
28. Gerhardt, supra note 17, at 689-90; Ted Gest, Disorder in the Courts?, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP., Feb. 12, 1996, at 40; see Neil A. Lewis, In Selecting Federal Judges, Clin-
ton Has Not Tried To Reverse Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at A20. President 
Clinton's appointees fell between the conservatives tapped by Presidents H.W. Bush and 
Reagan and the liberals tapped by President Carter. Lewis, supra. 
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The last two federal elections are salient. Your 51-49 victory was 
a tepid "mandate" and evidenced little about citizen ideas on ap-
pointments, while Senate returns left the GOP without the votes 
for cloture and the 2006 results ended its majority. 29 Thus, these 
elections and low public approval suggest that you de-emphasize 
ideology, pick consensus nominees, treat statements about favor-
ite Justices and appointees who do not legislate from the bench as 
campaign rhetoric, and extend overtures to the Democrats. 
3. Diversity 
Carefully assess gender and racial diversity. Some found your 
nominees as Governor lacked balance, 30 which echoes criticisms of 
the judges selected by Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush. 
In your first seven years, you appointed numerous female and mi-
nority lawyers, decisions that reflect how your father seated a 
number of women and how Clinton appointed an unprecedented 
number of females and minorites. 31 Both yours and your prede-
cessors' work increased the gender diversity President Reagan 
neglected, while you and President Clinton addressed deficient 
racial balance that earlier GOP presidents sustained. Yet, only 
men received Supreme Court appointment, pressure from conser-
vative activists led Ms. Miers to withdraw, and disparities remain 
because a few minority nominees' ideological conservatism de-
layed their review. One acute example is D.C. Circuit appointee 
Janice Rogers Brown, who was lauded for mocking the New Deal 
as the "triumph of our socialist revolution."32 
Many ideas justify enhancing diversity. Numerous women and 
people of color would assist colleagues to understand and resolve 
29. Brian Faler, A 51 Percent Mandate?, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2004, at AG. See gener-
ally Janet Hook, He's Not Walking Like a Lame Duck, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2005, at Al; Neil 
A. Lewis, The New Democratic Majority Throws Bush's Judicial Nominations into Uncer-
tainty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2006, § 1. 
30. Nicholas D. Kristof, The 2000 Campaign: Running Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 
2000, at Al; see also Jeffrey Toobin, Women in Black, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2000, at 
48 (assessing Bush's Texas judges). 
31. For your father, see Goldman, Final Imprint, supra note 11, at 286 & tbl.1; Tobias, 
supra note 8, at 1273; Carl Tobias, More Women Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L. REV. 
477, 477 (1991). For President Clinton, see Beiner, supra note 27, at 851; Solberg, supra 
note 12, at 276-77, 283. 
32. See Stuart Taylor, Radical on the Bench, LEGAL TIMES, May 2, 2005, at 70. But see 
Roger Pilon, She's the Right Radical, LEGAL TIMES, May 23, 2005 at 68-69. See generally 
Editorial, Reject Justice Brown, WASH. POST, June 7, 2005, at A22; Maura Reynolds, Sen-
ate Approves Brown, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2005, at Al. 
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vexing questions, such as abortion and discrimination, 33 and 
would curtail gender and racial bias in the judicial process. 34 
Their selection may demonstrate your amenability to improving 
conditions for women and minorities across the bar, the justice 
system, and the country. Having a federal bench that resembles 
the nation also inspires greater public confidence. 35 You might 
want to appoint highly competent, albeit less doctrinaire, jurists, 
whom Fourth Circuit Judges Roger Gregory and Allyson Duncan 
typify, as both easily won confirmation. 
This survey indicates that you must fill the present fifty vacan-
cies and the fifteen more that will open before your term con-
cludes with extraordinarily able jurists, increase gender and ra-
cial balance, and diminish unproductive politicization. Continue 
to ventilate and refine objectives while announcing clear goals 
and devising salutary means to realize them. 
B. Procedures for Achieving Your Goals 
In both campaigns, you pledged to limit divisiveness and to re-
quest floor votes sixty days ahead of judicial nomination, and 
since 2001 you have attempted to effectuate these objectives. 36 
Those are useful targets, but political and institutional realities, 
namely the consumption of time by selection entities, frustrate 
their achievement. These inherent obstacles and deficient re-
sources mean that FBI background checks, ABA scrutiny, and Ju-
33. See, e.g., George, supra note 8, at 19-21, 25-26, 31-33; Marion Zenn Goldberg, 
Carter-Appointed Judges: Perspectives on Gender, TRIAL, Apr. 1990, at 108; see also There-
sa M. Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New Millen-
nium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 599-600, 610-17 (2003). See generally Sheldon Goldman, 
Should There Be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary?, 62 JUDICATURE 488, 491 (1979); 
Dahlia Lithwick, John Roberts' Woman Problem, SLATE, Aug. 19, 2005, available at 
http://www.slate.com/id/2124 789. 
34. See, e.g., NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL, RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC 
FAIRNESS: FINAL REPORT 65-66 (1997), http:/1207.41.19.15/ (follow "Ninth Circuit Task 
Force on Racial, Religious, and Ethnic Fairness-Final Report" hyperlink; then follow "fi-
nalrep.pdf" hyperlink). See generally Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts: An 
Emerging Focus for Judicial Reform, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 237, 238 (1989). 
35. See Sheldon Goldman, A Profile of Carter's Judicial Nominees, 62 JUDICATURE 
246, 253 (1978); see also Editorial, The O'Connor Court, WASH. POST, July 2, 2005, at A28 
(noting how Justice O'Connor acted as a bridge between the left and right). But see Sher-
rilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 
WASH. AND LEE L. REV. 405, 481 (2000). 
36. Maria L. La Ganga, Bush Vows To Cure a Dysfunctional D.C., L.A. TIMES, June 9, 
2000, at A14. See generally 151 CONG. REC. S4463 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2005) (statement of 
Sen. Frist). 
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diciary Committee evaluation impose delays. 37 The urgency of 
other business and adherence to arcane rules prolong confirma-
tion. Senators from areas having vacancies may also block nomi-
nees, unanimous consent enables one member to delay floor ac-
tion, and cloture requires sixty votes. Notwithstanding such 
hurdles, the process might improve if you establish time frames, 
streamline analysis, and foster cooperation with Democrats-
ideas akin to views which you championed in the 2002 elections 
and in January 2007. 38 
1. General Procedures 
Restate your goals and practices through a national forum. 
This will inform aides and citizens. Explicate Department of Jus-
tice ("DOJ") roles, what selection officials do, and how much to re-
spect input by senators from jurisdictions with openings. Your 
three predecessors named all Supreme Court and many appellate 
nominees, deferred to senators on trial court vacancies, and asked 
that serious candidates receive DOJ investigation, and you em-
ployed analogous regimens over your initial seven years. Nomi-
nating Justices and circuit judges warrants assessment, even 
though you will monopolize the choices, so ensure that staff effec-
tuate your objectives and use dependable avenues to realize 
them. The designation of Justices also reflects uncontrollable dy-
namics, including the judicial philosophy held by the resignee and 
timing vis-a-vis the election cycle. Yet, the process's importance 
and drain on scarce resources, which otherwise would apply to 
circuit and district judgeships, require that you maintain a "short 
list."39 The departure of Justice O'Connor and death of Chief Jus-
37. See Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem 
and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319, 333-37 (1994); Carl Tobias, Federal Judi-
cial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527, 532-39 (1998); supra 
note 16 and accompanying text. 
38. Mike Allen & Amy Goldstein, Bush Has Plan To Speed Judicial Confirmations, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2002, at A21; Edwin Chen & Henry Weinstein, Election 2002: Liber-
als Bracing for Quick Judicial Action by Bush, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at A22; Neil A 
Lewis, Bush Drops Plans To Resubmit 3 Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007, at 
A18; see Thomas 0. Sargentich, Citizens for Independent Courts, Report of the Task Force 
on Federal Judicial Selection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1031, 1038-48 (1999) (offering useful 
suggestions). 
39. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An 
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 25 (2004); Neil A Lewis, 
Court in Transition: Possible Nominees; In List of Potential Justices, Many Kinds of Con-
servative, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at A13; see Kenneth G. Manning et al., George W. 
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tice Rehnquist are instructive. 40 Her resignation arguably neces-
sitated your selection of a moderate conservative, while his death 
prompted you to name Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Alito's suc-
cess and the failed Miers nomination correspondingly epitomize 
politics's importance. Administrations with varied outlooks found 
similar techniques efficacious, so monumental change is not indi-
cated. 
Work assiduously with the Senate Judiciary Committee, which 
exercises lead responsibility for analyzing nominees, and its 
chair, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), who schedules hearings and 
votes. Enlist his thinking generally and on the designees recom-
mended. Consultation will also facilitate your activities. Thus, be-
fore nomination, derive insights from Senator Leahy, earlier 
chairs, and senators in locales with openings. Solicit help as well 
from the Majority Leader, Senator Harry Reid (D-Nev.), who 
regulates floor action. 
Glean incisive perspectives from history. For example, consulta-
tion has improved appointments by tempering discord. President 
Clinton frequently broached with the GOP the nominees under 
review, senators asked for your consultation and they offered to 
designate lawyers whom your administration might name. 41 Re-
publicans concomitantly ascribed delay to President Clinton's 
penchant for transmitting immediately before Senate recesses 
many attorneys, numbers of whom the GOP deemed unpalatable, 
and this frustrated confirmation. 42 You may address these con-
cerns by steadily recommending numerous, highly qualified des-
ignees, a task the few vacancies ease. The White House might 
Bush's Potential Supreme Court Nominees: What Impact Might They Have?, 85 
JUDICATURE 278, 279-80 (2002). 
40. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, A Judge Anchored in Modern Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 
20, 2005, at Al; Louis Menand, Decisions, Decisions, THE NEW YORKER, July 11, 2005, at 
33; see also Editorial, Judge Roberts's Record, WASH. POST, July 25, 2005, at A18; Edito-
rial, Justice O'Connor, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at A14. 
41. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 333 (2000); see 
Linda Greenhouse, Picking Non-Justice Would Return to Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 
2005, at A16; Carolyn Lochhead, Bush Asks Senators for Advice on Court Pick, S.F. 
CHRON., July 13, 2005, at A3. 
42. See GERHARDT, supra note 41, at 123-26, 333; Tobias, supra note 13, at 843; see 
also Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 12, at 268; Orrin G. Hatch, Judicial Nominee Con-
firmations Are Smoother Now, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 27, 1998, at 9A. See generally 
supra notes 12 & 41. 
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also solicit the counsel of officials who have recruited judges dur-
ing the past twenty years. 43 
The process will be delayed and scrutinized, as your admini-
stration ends, and politics will influence whom you choose. Last-
term presidents, with ostensible mandates, have a reservoir of 
good will and substantial authority when forwarding names, but 
they may expend limited political capital on nominees. 44 One mis-
step can upset the whole selection regime, a phenomenon that the 
nomination of Harriet Miers exemplified. 45 
2. Special Efforts To Increase Diversity 
Canvass fruitful means to increase gender and racial diversity. 
Helpful beginnings are earlier presidents' actions and specific 
work undertaken throughout your first seven years. You must in-
vestigate productive ways to redouble the various efforts you have 
taken thus far. For instance, President Carter applied merit selec-
tion bodies, while your father and President Clinton encouraged 
their parties' senators to identify numbers ofwomen. 46 
Appointing trial judges deserves consideration, as senators 
where positions are vacant have great leverage. 47 You might re-
quest that officials institute or use available techniques, such as 
nominating panels, to designate and guarantee the confirmation 
of female and minority jurists. 48 Lawmakers and White House 
personnel also should elicit guidance from conventional sources, 
including bar associations, and less traditional organizations, 
43. Examples include Clinton Administration Assistant Attorney General Eleanor 
Dean Acheson and Deputy White House Counsel William Marshall, as well as Bush Ad-
ministration White House Counsel Boyden Gray. Shepherding the Next Court Nominee, 
LEGAL TIMES, July 4, 2005, at 11; see supra notes 9-13. 
44. See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 17, at 689; Goldman, Wars, supra note 11, at 899; 
see also Hendrik Hertzberg, Roe v. Rove, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 1, 2005, at 25, 26. But see 
Hook, supra note 29; Doyle McManus, After Flagging Support, A Second Wind for Bush, 
L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2005, at Al. See generally Elsa Walsh, Minority Retort, THE NEW 
YORKER, Aug. 8, 2005, at 42. 
45. See generally Robin Toner et al., Steady Erosion in Support Undercut Nomination, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2006, at A16. 
46. See Tobias, supra note 31, at 479-80 (Bush request); Neil A. Lewis, Unmaking the 
G.O.P. Court Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at AlO (Clinton request); supra note 7; 
infra note 55 (Carter panels). 
47. Recent Presidents have retained exclusive control over selection for the Supreme 
Court and considerable control over selection for the appellate courts. See supra notes 9-
13. 
48. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also text accompanying note 4 7. 
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namely women's and minority political groups, which know about 
candidates. Seek the assistance of female and minority legisla-
tors, who should urge their colleagues to delineate, and help ap-
prove, women and persons of color. Similarly valuable will be the 
talents and networking of female and minority attorneys, who 
represent one in three lawyers, as well as high-profile women and 
people of color, especially Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and 
Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao. 
3. Other Specific Actions 
Survey, and perhaps apply, innovative concepts to fill all va-
cancies and enhance gender and racial balance. One direct me-
thod is tapping lawyers, including numerous women and persons 
of color, for every open seat. A related approach may be the crea-
tion of new judgeships. 49 This is defensible, as those requests are 
grounded on filings and workloads50 that have multiplied since 
1990 when a thorough statute last passed. 51 Bipartisanship 
would flourish if Democrats could offer nominees in exchange for 
approval of yours or judgeships, or for limited filibuster use and 
protracted, robust Senate debate, ideas the 2005 Memorandum of 
Understanding helps elucidate. 52 
Other bold strokes that would deemphasize politics's adverse im-
pacts are elevating Clinton appointees, resubmitting his nominees, 
and advocating Democrats. Remember, you moved Barrington 
Parker to the Second Circuit and designated Judge Gregory, after 
President Clinton had named him the first African-American 
Fourth Circuit judge, with a recess appointment. 53 If you tender a 
49. See H.R. 3520, llOth Cong. (2007); S. 525, llOth Cong. (2007); H.R. 221, llOth 
Cong. (2007); see also Tobias, supra note 23, at 749. See generally WILLIAM REHNQUIST, 
2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3 (2004); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 21-23 
(Mar. 13, 2007). 
50. See JOHN G. ROBERTS, 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9-15 
(2007); Tobias, supra note 23, at 748-49. But see J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks 
of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORYL.J. 1147, 1161-63 (1994). 
51. Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5098. A bill appears 
futile without a better process. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
52. See Compromise in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at A18 (reprinting the Me-
morandum after it was released); see Hendrik Hertzberg, Filibluster, THE NEW YORKER, June 
13, 2005, at 63. Enhancing ABA input may be salutary. See Little, supra note 16. 
53. Senate Confirms Gregory to Seat on 4th Circuit, WASH. POST, July 21, 2001, at A2; 
see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 
2004); United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1009, 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985); William 
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Clinton nominee whom the GOP Senate majority declined to ana-
lyze, the lengthy Sixth Circuit battle will end. 54 As profitable to ad-
dress chronic impasses would be merit selection groups that recom-
mend a few attorneys from whom you choose. 55 
You should attempt to devise relief for the chronic appointments 
problem; however, not even dramatic reform will deter Republicans 
and Democrats from incessantly seeking advantage. One way to 
break the relentless payback cycle is an accord that eliminates the 
vacancies and allows Democrats to furnish some judges, thus inau-
gurating a bipartisan confirmation process.56 Assume a leadership 
role by emphasizing merit and downplaying ideology. At least re-
frain from conduct that perpetuates or escalates the unhealthy dy-
namic. 
If these actions fail to halt gridlock, you should jettison less con-
structive remedies. A number of efforts that you deemed salutary in 
the past seven years were actually unproductive. Illustrative was re-
liance on your office as a bully pulpit to force the judicial selection 
conundrum and accuse Democrats of obstructionism, an exercise 
that intensified polarization. Equally confrontational were recess 
appointments. 57 This vehicle has minimal utility for confirming 
Ty Mayton, Recess Appointments and an Independent Judiciary, 20 CONST. COMMENT 515, 
516 (2003). See generally Thomas A. Curtis, Recess Appointments to Article Ill Courts: The 
Use of Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758 (1984). 
54. 151 CONG. REC. S5030 (daily ed. May 12, 2005) (statement of Sen. Reid); Dawson 
Bell, Judge Deadlock Closer to an End; Bush Nominees Include a Democrat, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS, June 29, 2006, at 2. The same was true in the D.C. Circuit. See Helen Dewar, Bush 
Calls for Limit to Senate Debates, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2003, at A4; Neil A. Lewis, Im-
passe on Judicial Pick Defies Quick Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2003, at A16. 
55. Previous examples are one Carter panel, a Michigan 2001 proposal, a California 
2001 district panel, and a High Court 2005 proposal. See Carl Levin & Debbie Stabenow, 
Bipartisanship Can End Judge Stalemate, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Dec. 5, 2001, at A15; 
Henry Weinstein, Process of Judge Selection Set Up, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2001, at Bl. See 
generally LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE 
NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1980) (discussing 
the commission, its procedures, and successes). 
56. Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges 
To Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254, 271-72 (1997). This does raise the spectre of horsetrading. 
Variations on numerous suggestions which I have evaluated above are senators' provision of 
candidates who satisfy presidential criteria or provision of alternating recommendations in 
states with one senator from each party. See Gerhardt, supra note 17, at 688. 
57. In 2004, you provided recess appointments for Fifth Circuit Judge Charles Picker-
ing and for Eleventh Circuit Judge William Pryor. See Editorial, Judicial Activism, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2004, at Al4; Charles Yoo, Pryor Finally Sworn In as Appeals Court 
Judge, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 21, 2005, at B4; see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Different 
Timpanist, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2005, at A14. See generally Jonathan Turley, The Not So 
Dirty Dozen, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2005; supra note 53. 
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judges; as nominees frequently decline the invitation, while the me-
chanism's employment infuriate potential opponents and raise deli-
cate constitutional questions. 58 When you renominated appellate 
candidates whom Democrats blocked in recent years, that also exac-
erbated tensions, but your January 2007 decision against resubmis-
sion of three controversial nominees appeared promising. 59 
An unorthodox idea would be to explore amelioration of conflicts 
by decreasing the stakes through modification of life tenure. 60 Pro-
vocative notions include electing Justices and requiring set, lengthy 
terms. 61 In the final analysis, subverting the choice of judges for 
ephemeral political gain would be a mistake, because the action will 
diminish respect for the branches. 62 
58. Appeals courts have held recess appointments constitutional but none occurred 
from 1981 to 1999. Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 2004); United States 
v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1009 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Goldman, Wars, supra note 11, at 
901 (favoring recess appointments). See generally Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appoint· 
ments of Article III Judges: Three Constitutional Questions, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 377 (2005) 
(discussing the constitutionality of recess appointments). 
59. See, e.g., Jonathan Groner, Judiciary Battles Start Anew, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 13, 
2003, at 10; Lewis, supra note 38; see also Michael A. Fletcher & Charles Babington, Bush 
Tries His Luck Again with Judicial Nominees, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2005, at A5. But see 
Editorial, Benched Nominees, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2007, at Al2; Jonathan Turley, De-
mocrats' Disarray Muddies Court Fight, BALT. SUN, July 14, 2005, at 21A; supra text ac-
companying note 38. 
60. See, e.g., Kevin T. McGuire, Are the Justices Serving Too Long? An Assessment of 
Tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court, 89 JUDICATURE 8, 8-9 (2005); L.A. Powe, Jr., Old Peo-
ple and Good Behavior, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 195, 195-97 (1995); Jeff Jacoby, Don't Let 
Judges Serve for Life, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 2005, at Al9. See generally David G. Sav-
age & Henry Weinstein, Roberts Was Not Strictly Conservative, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2005, 
at Al2. 
61. Were either of these notions constitutional, the disadvantages, particularly vis-a-vis 
judicial independence, might eclipse the benefits for the confirmation process. See PAUL D. 
CARRINGTON & ROGER C. CRAMTON, THE SUPREME COURT RENEWAL ACT: A RETURN TO 
BASIC PRINCIPLES (2005), available at http://zfacts.com/metaPage/lib/205-SUPREME-
COURT.pdf; RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT 
NOMINATION PROCESS 170-72, 175 (2005). But see Ward Farnsworth, The Regulation of 
Turnover on the Supreme Court, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 407 (defending the "constitutional 
system of life tenure"). See generally Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits 
for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL 'Y 769 (2006); 
Edward T. Swaine, Hail, No: Changing the Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1709 (2006) 
(evaluating novel methods for selecting the Chief Justice). 
62. See Carl Hulse, Filibuster Fight Is Bruising the Image of Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 22, 2005, § 1, at 24. You recognized similar propositions at the first term's outset and 
when you considered nominating Justice O'Connor's replacement. See President's Re-
marks, supra note 14; Greenhouse, supra note 41; Hertzberg, supra note 52; Lochhead, 
supra note 41. 
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CONCLUSION 
As your presidency draws to a close, unoccupied judgeships will 
receive scrutiny. If you enunciate laudable objectives, namely 
having merit guide selection, use innovative, transparent devices 
to realize them, forge consensus with Democrats and reject poli-
tics for the nation's good, those measures will fill all vacancies 
with talented jurists, especially numerous women and people of 
color. How well you discharge this pressing, complex assignment 
will strongly influence the federal judiciary and profoundly affect 
your legacy. 
